

Gender and the Labor Market

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14.771

Female Labor supply and empowerment

- In most developed country settings, female labor supply is considered as a marker for low bargaining power (leisure=private good)
- But in many developing country settings (perhaps particularly in South Asia) it seems women want to work and their husband do not want them to work (Fletcher, Pande, Moore 2019)
- Substantial misallocation: Hsieh et al (Econometrica) argue that in the US, entry of Black people and women in better paid location have led to “In 1960, 94 percent of doctors and lawyers were white men. By 2010, the fraction was just 62 percent.” and calibrate that 20% to 40% of output growth can be explained by this.
- “Acting wife” : in a very different context (women attending MBA at top B school) , unmarried women were willing to take costly steps to not demonstrate professional ambition in front of men (Bursztyn, Fujiwara, Pallais, 2017)

Female Labor supply and empowerment

- This is consistent with limited commitment EHM: women want to work to increase their bargaining power, and men don't want that, either to protect their own bargaining power, or because they have direct disutility to see their woman work
- There could also be a social norm against female working.

Legal framework: Women and the Law, Hyland et al, AER insights, 2020

- World bank has put together a new data base on gender rights
- The average is 75 out of 100 (women have 3/4 of the rights of men).
- It is 40% in MENA, 60% in South Asia
- Strong correlation between legal rights and the FLFP as well as gender wage gap (which does not have to be causal).

Culture and Social norms

Alesina, Guiliano and Nunn


- Esther Boserup's hypothesis: in regions where the plow was dominant, males were more involved in the working of the field, and women less valued
- Hypothesis: this persisted over time.
- They use FAO data base on crop suitability to build an index of where the plow was more likely to be used.
- And correlated with today's social norms.

Culture and Social norms

ORIGINS OF GENDER ROLES

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(a) Traditional plough use and current FLFP




Miss-perception of social norms

Burztein, Gonzalez and Yanagizawa-Drott

- Experiment with 500 young men in Saudi Arabia
- 87% agree with the statement “In my opinion, women should be allowed to work outside of the home”
- But when asked how many other men have this opinion, three quarter under estimate the true number
- The experiment gives half of them the right number.
- Then they got the choice between \$5 Amazon certificate and opportunity to sign their wife for a platform on job.
- And follow up calls for longer term outcomes.

Miss-perception of social norms


Figure 4: Job-Matching Service Sign-up
(*Main Experiment*)



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
Miss-perception of social norms

Figure 5: Long-term Labor Supply Outcomes
(Follow-up)



Miss-perception of social norms

Figure 6: Job-Matching Service Sign-up–Heterogeneity by Wedge
(*Main Experiment*)



Other norms standing in the way...

- Bertrand , Pan, Kamenica : women must earn less than their husband
- Goldin (2020): the norm of "full pay full week, long hours" may be what is holding women now.

Can Norms be changed by teaching?

Dhar, Jain, Jayachandran "Reshaping adolescents' gender attitude"

- This mis-perception suggests that perhaps norms are not a fatality
- A literature shows that relatively superficial interventions change norms such as whether females can make good leaders (Beaman et al, 2013), fertility (La Ferrara, soap opera in Brazil).
- Work in collaboration with a local NGO in North India (Breakthrough) to try to affect adolescent view of women and girls
- 45 minutes classroom discussions on various topic related to gender once every 3 weeks for 2 school years
- RCT in 314 schools in Haryana (a state in India with very bad gender culture), 14,000 students
- Find 0.25 SD improvement on self-reported gender norms at end of intervention, and some effects on behavior (especially among boys).

Teaching social norms

Table 2: Average effects of the gender attitude-change intervention

	Gender Attitudes Index (1)	Aspirations Index (2)	Girls' Behavior Index (3)	Boys' Behavior Index (4)	Behavior Index (5)
Treated	0.250*** [0.019]	0.052*** [0.019]	0.199*** [0.031]	0.461*** [0.031]	0.323*** [0.022]
Basic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Extended controls	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	13988	13988	7787	6201	13988

Getting women to participate in the labor force

- Given the disagreement between men and women on labor supply one could:
 - ① Change husband's opinions
 - ② Change wife's ability to advocate for themselves

McKelway, 2021 “Women’s employment in India: Intra-household and intra personal constraints

- Job market paper: experiment she conducted on her own on a shoestring...well worth reading!!
- Cross randomized two interventions with large carpet manufacturer in India who was interested in recruiting more women.
- Setting: Uttar Pradesh, poor area with backwards gender norms and very low FLP
 - Psychosocial intervention (Generalized Self Efficacy, Bandura 1977)-training over several weeks
 - Promotion of the job to the husband and in laws (6 minutes video)

GSE training affect GSE, not promo

Table 3: Effects on Women's GSE

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	% GSE Questions Agreed With			
	at 5 Weeks	at 6 Weeks	at 5 Months	at 13 Months
Panel A: Unsaturated Specification				
γ_1 : GSE Treat	4.959 (2.013) [0.015]	3.230 (1.796) [0.074]	3.123 (1.681) [0.065]	3.890 (1.964) [0.049]
γ_2 : Promo Treat	1.548 (2.135) [0.469]	0.121 (1.938) [0.950]	0.337 (1.794) [0.851]	0.032 (2.211) [0.988]
P-Value for Test that:				
$\gamma_1 = \gamma_2$	0.254	0.228	0.240	0.197
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Panel B: Saturated Specification				
β_1 : GSE Treat & Promo Control	2.662 (3.022) [0.379]	5.607 (2.758) [0.043]	3.616 (2.505) [0.150]	3.286 (2.741) [0.232]
β_2 : GSE Control & Promo Treat	-1.130 (2.977) [0.705]	2.344 (2.590) [0.366]	0.625 (2.513) [0.804]	-1.182 (2.981) [0.692]
β_3 : GSE Treat & Promo Treat	6.638 (2.825) [0.019]	3.231 (2.684) [0.229]	3.330 (2.597) [0.201]	3.271 (2.865) [0.255]
P-Value for Test that:				
$\beta_1 = \beta_2$	0.196	0.197	0.208	0.127
$\beta_1 = \beta_3$	0.152	0.364	0.906	0.996
$\beta_2 = \beta_3$	0.004	0.716	0.276	0.131
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
GSE Control & Promo Control Mean	72.166	75.093	78.081	73.793
N Women	868	855	795	674

GSE and promo alone affect work off farm, but not combined

Table 4: Effects on Women's Employment

	(1) Participation in Firm's Program		(3)	(4) Working off Own Farm (=1)		(5)	
	Attended in			at 6 Weeks	at 5 Months		at 13 Months
	Signed Up (=1)	First 2 Months (=1)					
Panel A: Unsaturated Specification							
γ_1 : GSE Treat	-0.008 (0.025) [0.739]	-0.003 (0.018) [0.866]	0.001 (0.020) [0.963]	0.022 (0.024) [0.365]	-0.006 (0.029) [0.847]		
γ_2 : Promo Treat	0.038 (0.028) [0.177]	0.016 (0.020) [0.416]	-0.002 (0.022) [0.916]	0.018 (0.027) [0.505]	-0.008 (0.032) [0.799]		
P-Value for Test that:							
$\gamma_1 = \gamma_2$	0.240	0.496	0.919	0.921	0.952		
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Panel B: Saturated Specification							
β_1 : GSE Treat & Promo Control	0.048 (0.035) [0.169]	0.035 (0.024) [0.152]	0.061 (0.029) [0.039]	0.087 (0.033) [0.009]	0.005 (0.043) [0.905]		
β_2 : GSE Control & Promo Treat	0.096 (0.038) [0.012]	0.055 (0.025) [0.032]	0.061 (0.028) [0.030]	0.076 (0.034) [0.027]	-0.007 (0.041) [0.863]		
β_3 : GSE Treat & Promo Treat	0.029 (0.036) [0.412]	0.013 (0.025) [0.605]	-0.003 (0.027) [0.912]	0.038 (0.036) [0.301]	-0.012 (0.043) [0.779]		
P-Value for Test that:							
$\beta_1 = \beta_2$	0.218	0.479	0.984	0.772	0.764		
$\beta_1 = \beta_3$	0.593	0.410	0.032	0.188	0.678		
$\beta_2 = \beta_3$	0.087	0.132	0.026	0.321	0.905		
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
GSE Control & Promo Control Mean	0.221	0.085	0.131	0.187	0.190		
N Women	1022	1022	854	794	674		

Notes: This table presents effects on women's employment. The outcome in column (1) is an indicator for signing up for the firm's program, and the outcome in column (2) is an indicator for ever attending the program in the first two months of training. The outcomes in columns (3)-(5) are indicators for having done any work for income off one's household's farm in the preceding two weeks. They come from women's six-week, five-month, and 13-month surveys. See Appendix Section G.3 for additional information on the outcomes in this table. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by household and by meeting group in Panel A, and clustered by household and by meeting group \times promotion treatment in Panel B. P-values are in brackets.

Does labor supply indeed increase bargaining power?

Field, Moore, Pande, Rigol, Schaner, 2019 “on her account..”

- Experiment in Madhya Pradesh
- Government gave women access to bank account to randomly selected GP
- In one treatment they linked NREGA (workfare) payment to it
- Can therefore look at the effect of an account, and the effect of having wages linked to an account
- In the short run this increased labor supply in the program but also outside the program (including in cash payment work)
- Effects are stronger among women who had never worked for NREGA at baseline (and whose husband generally were less likely to support women working): they interpret this as increase in bargaining power

Table 3: Impact of Treatments on Women's Labour Supply

	Aggregate Labor Supply Index		MGNREGS Labor Supply Sub-Index		Private Labor Supply Sub-Index	
	Short-Run	Long-Run	Short-Run	Long-Run	Short-Run	Long-Run
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: Full sample</i>						
θ : Direct Deposit and Training	0.165*** (0.042)	0.045 (0.048)	0.186*** (0.071)	0.021 (0.080)	0.166*** (0.050)	0.048 (0.062)
Accts Only Mean	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000
N	2504	2464	2504	2464	2504	2464
<i>Panel B: Constrained Women</i>						
θ : Direct Deposit and Training	0.213*** (0.051)	0.193*** (0.060)	0.263** (0.111)	0.069 (0.073)	0.226*** (0.059)	0.279*** (0.097)
Accts Only Mean	-0.122	-0.186	-0.049	-0.102	-0.163	-0.275
N	922	903	922	903	922	903
<i>Panel C: Unconstrained Women</i>						
θ : Direct Deposit and Training	0.150*** (0.052)	-0.036 (0.057)	0.168** (0.071)	-0.008 (0.102)	0.153** (0.071)	-0.094 (0.059)
Accts Only Mean	0.061	0.108	0.033	0.067	0.080	0.156
N	1519	1501	1519	1501	1519	1501
P-value: Panel B θ = Panel C θ	0.276	0.001***	0.343	0.398	0.352	0.000***

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. All regressions include strata and district fixed effects. Additional covariates are selected using double post lasso. The set of potential controls includes individual and GP-level characteristics and their square. See Online Data Appendix for the complete list of potential controls. * $p \leq 0.10$, ** $p \leq 0.05$, *** $p \leq 0.10$. The labor supply index is an average of the MGNREGS, private, and general labor sub-indices. All sub-index components are standardized with respect to the Accounts Only group. The MGNREGS

Table 4: Impact of Treatments on Empowerment

	Aggregate Empowerment Index		Purchase Index		Mobility in Past Year		Self-Reported Decision Making	
	Short-Run	Long-Run	Short-Run	Long-Run	Short-Run	Long-Run	Short-Run	Long-Run
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Full sample</i>								
θ : Direct Deposit and Training	0.041 (0.032)	0.032 (0.034)	0.096* (0.053)	0.039 (0.063)	0.037 (0.036)	0.053 (0.035)	-0.021 (0.053)	0.019 (0.045)
Accts Only Mean	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000
N	2504	2453	2504	2453	2504	2464	2504	2464
<i>Panel B: Constrained Women</i>								
θ : Direct Deposit and Training	0.100*** (0.037)	0.144*** (0.049)	0.239*** (0.067)	0.238*** (0.080)	0.023 (0.052)	0.115** (0.056)	0.041 (0.064)	0.062 (0.078)
Accts Only Mean	-0.028	-0.111	-0.089	-0.218	0.054	-0.042	-0.050	-0.084
N	922	897	922	897	922	903	922	903
<i>Panel C: Unconstrained Women</i>								
θ : Direct Deposit and Training	0.026 (0.041)	-0.022 (0.036)	0.042 (0.065)	-0.059 (0.069)	0.060 (0.044)	-0.001 (0.040)	-0.030 (0.071)	-0.005 (0.056)
Accts Only Mean	0.010	0.055	0.037	0.102	-0.031	0.027	0.025	0.035
N	1519	1496	1519	1496	1519	1501	1519	1501
P-value: Panel B θ = Panel C θ	0.145	0.002***	0.029**	0.002***	0.538	0.061*	0.430	0.487

Long run effect

- In the longer run norms themselves got affected. Actual norms

Table 5: Impact of Treatments on Actual Norms

	Female Reports				Male Reports			
	Actual Norms Index (1)	Personal Preferences (2)	Acceptance: Working Women (3)	Acceptance: Husbands (4)	Actual Norms Index (5)	Personal Preferences (6)	Acceptance: Working Women (7)	Acceptance: Husbands (8)
<i>Panel A: Full sample</i>								
θ : Direct Deposit and Training	0.110*** (0.040)	0.098** (0.044)	0.091 (0.061)	0.087 (0.060)	-0.011 (0.043)	-0.059 (0.070)	0.015 (0.051)	-0.024 (0.057)
Accts Only Mean	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.077	0.180	0.001	0.049
N	2464	2464	2464	2464	2293	2293	2293	2293
<i>Panel B: Constrained Women</i>								
θ : Direct Deposit and Training	0.215*** (0.051)	0.160** (0.069)	0.243*** (0.073)	0.210*** (0.077)	-0.036 (0.082)	0.012 (0.109)	-0.020 (0.083)	-0.099 (0.103)
Accts Only Mean	-0.095	-0.068	-0.099	-0.117	0.066	0.091	0.045	0.062
N	903	903	903	903	837	837	837	837
<i>Panel C: Unconstrained Women</i>								
θ : Direct Deposit and Training	0.050 (0.054)	0.059 (0.059)	0.007 (0.079)	0.019 (0.073)	-0.001 (0.043)	-0.083 (0.079)	0.040 (0.063)	-0.007 (0.057)
Accts Only Mean	0.048	0.043	0.048	0.054	0.080	0.218	-0.024	0.046
N	1501	1501	1501	1501	1403	1403	1403	1403
P-value: Panel B θ = Panel C θ	0.024**	0.269	0.017**	0.040**	0.688	0.427	0.564	0.409

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. All regressions include strata and district fixed effects. Additional covariates are selected using double post lasso. The set of potential controls includes individual and GP-level characteristics and their square. See Online Data Appendix for the complete list of potential controls. * $p \leq 0.10$, ** $p \leq 0.05$, *** $p \leq 0.01$. These questions were only asked in the long run survey. The actual norms index is the average of the personal preference, acceptance of working women, and acceptance of husbands sub-indices (columns 2-4). All sub-index components are standardized with respect to the Accounts Only group. The personal preferences index includes if the respondent believes that women can work, if prefers to have a daughter-in-law who wants to work for pay, and if prefers to have a son-in-law who allows daughter to work for pay. The acceptance indices are derived from a series of vignette questions featuring a housewife and working woman. The acceptance of working women sub-index includes if the respondent believes the working woman is the better wife, if believes the working woman is the better mother, and if believes the working woman is the better caretaker. The acceptance of husbands index includes if the respondent believes the working woman's husband is a better provider and if believes the working woman's husband is a better husband. See Online Data Appendix for further details on variable construction.

Long run effect

- In the longer run norms themselves got affected. Perceived norms.

Table 6: Impact of Treatments on Perceived Norms

	Female Reports			Male Reports		
	Perceived Norms Index (1)	Perceived Norms: Acceptance Working Women (2)	Perceived Norms: Acceptance Husbands (3)	Perceived Norms Index (4)	Perceived Norms: Acceptance Working Women (5)	Perceived Norms: Acceptance Husbands (6)
	<i>Panel A: Full sample</i>					
θ : Direct Deposit and Training	0.062 (0.039)	0.079** (0.040)	0.050 (0.046)	0.087** (0.044)	0.062 (0.053)	0.113** (0.052)
Accts Only Mean	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.236	-0.138	-0.334
N	2464	2464	2464	2292	2292	2292
<i>Panel B: Constrained Women</i>						
θ : Direct Deposit and Training	0.116* (0.069)	0.096 (0.071)	0.152* (0.080)	0.102 (0.078)	0.030 (0.095)	0.174** (0.084)
Accts Only Mean	-0.079	-0.064	-0.094	-0.310	-0.188	-0.432
N	903	903	903	836	836	836
<i>Panel C: Unconstrained Women</i>						
θ : Direct Deposit and Training	0.007 (0.043)	0.052 (0.048)	-0.037 (0.051)	0.115** (0.046)	0.090 (0.063)	0.121** (0.052)
Accts Only Mean	0.047	0.041	0.053	-0.200	-0.117	-0.284
N	1501	1501	1501	1403	1403	1403
P-value: Panel B θ = Panel C θ	0.168	0.606	0.041**	0.882	0.597	0.520

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. All regressions include strata and district fixed effects. Additional covariates are selected using double post lasso. The set of potential controls includes individual and GP-level characteristics and their square. See Online Data Appendix for the complete list of potential controls. * $p \leq 0.10$, ** $p \leq 0.05$, *** $p \leq 0.01$. These questions were only asked in the long run survey. The perceived norms index is the average of the perceived acceptance of making money and the perceived acceptance of making women's husbands.

Less sanguine results from McKelway, 2020

- She follow decision making in households where husband where given promotion
- In the short run, women spend more time working but just as much time on chore
- At 4 months, they think they have more decision making power, but their family does not...
- Women quickly dropped out of the job (often because it was incompatible with her other responsibilities).
- In The Fletcher et al paper, many woman who are currently not working would consider a part time job.

McKelway, impact of labor supply on family decision

Table 3: Effects on Women's Involvement in Household Decision-Making

	(1)	(2)
	Woman Makes Decisions Index	
	Woman's Report	Family's Report
Promo Treat	0.246 (0.094) [0.009]	0.018 (0.095) [0.849]
Strata FE	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes
Control Mean	0.000	0.000
N Women	390	379

Notes: The outcomes are from the four-month end-line surveys. Respondents were asked who in their households usually makes decisions about nine different things. I define indicators that take the value of one if the woman was said to make the decision alone or together with others, and zero otherwise. I aggregate the indicators into summary indices. The outcome in column (1) is the index of women's reports, and the outcome in column (2) is the index of family members' reports. Standard errors are clustered by household

Women and multitasking

- Perhaps the strongest norm is that women must take care of children.
- We saw that in cote d'Ivoire where they are residual claimant of putting food on the table
- This may explain another stylized “fact”: returns on women's business are lower than returns on men's business (first established by De Mel, McKenzie, Woodruff (2009) in an RCT where they gave grants to small business as part of a RCT : they show large profit increases for male owners but not female owners.

Why do female owned business appear less productive?

- Bernhardt, Field, Pande, Rigol (2019, AER insight). argue that this does not reflect lower profitability of female businesses per se, but the fact that money given to women gets invested in the husband's business: when aggregated at the household level, the revenues do go up. (new data from India and revisit Ghana and Sri Lanka results).
- Delecourt & Ng (2021) run an experiment with vegetable vendors and show that, given the same inputs at the beginning of the day, women and men make the same amount of money
- Therefore the lower investment in the female business is a choice
- Which may reflect that women's businesses are constrained by child care: something they can do while minding kids.
- The same constraint may make it difficult for them to get or keep jobs, and also be one reason why promotions are constrained.

Conclusion

- Very active agenda of research on gender in developing countries
- Labor market just scratch the surface..
- Politics (Chattopadhyay-Duflo), insecurity (Borker), etc.

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